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Precap; Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Weber: Must Big 
Mountain Jesus Come Down from the Hillside? 
 
Constance Van Kley  
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
Does the Freedom from Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) have 
standing to bring suit? 
Does the continued authorization of a privately owned statue of 
Jesus Christ on publically owned land violate the Establishment Clause 
when the statue serves some secular purpose and is within the boundaries 
of a privately operated ski resort? 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1953, the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) issued a 
Special Use Permit to the Knights of Columbus to erect and maintain a 
six-foot-tall stone and cement statue of Jesus Christ on USFS land leased 
to a private ski resort, Whitefish Mountain Resort (“Big Mountain”).1 
When the Knights of Columbus placed the statue in 1954, it was seventy 
feet above the top of the Big Mountain’s sole ski lift.2 When the resort 
expanded in 1960 and again in 1968, chairlifts carried skiers above the 
site of the statue, allowing patrons to encounter Big Mountain Jesus on 
their way down the slopes.3 
The Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic organization, 
approached the USFS in response to requests from some of its members, 
veterans of WWII who had encountered similar religious statuary on 
Italian slopes during tours in Europe.4 It is unclear whether the statue was 
initially placed to honor fallen soldiers, but a plaque placed nearby in 
2010 suggests that Big Mountain Jesus serves such a commemorative 
purpose.5 The Knights of Columbus were certainly also motivated by 
religious sympathy, as evidenced by the subject of the statue as well as 
its chosen location, which one member described as chosen by “Our 
Lord himself.”6 
Big Mountain Jesus has served mixed purposes over the years. 
Religious ceremonies, including weddings and worship, have been held 
at the site, but the parties dispute the frequency of religious use.7 Before 
skiers carried cell phones, friends found the statue served as a convenient 
                                           
1 Order 3, June 25, 2013, No. 9:12-cv-00019. 
2 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 9, Apr. 30, 2014, No. 13-35770. 
3 Id. 
4 Order 5-7. 
5 Id. at 7.  
6 Id. at 5. 
7 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 12; Appellant’s Principal Br. 16, Jan. 8. 2014, No. 13-35770. 
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meeting place. The incongruousness of Big Mountain Jesus, partially 
obscured by trees,8 has brought out a spirit of irreverence and playfulness 
in many. The statue, regularly featured in skiers’ photos, is often found 
dressed in ski gear and other attire.9 Big Mountain Jesus’s hands have so 
frequently been broken off by passing skiers’ high-fives that Big 
Mountain placed a fence around the area in an unsuccessful attempt to 
prevent further damage.10 
Although the initial Special Use Permit had no designated 
expiration date, the USFS renewed the permit in 1990 and 2000 for ten-
year terms.11 The USFS then denied renewal in 2011, citing case law 
potentially implicating the constitutionality of further authorizations.12 
The Knights of Columbus appealed the denial, and the USFS withdrew 
its decision, requesting feedback from the public before making a final 
determination.13 The public spoke overwhelmingly in favor of renewing 
the permit. The USFS also reached out to the Montana State Historic 
Preservation Office, which found that the statue was eligible for listing 
on the National Register of Historic Places. The USFS reauthorized the 
permit in 2012, citing the historical importance of the statue to Big 
Mountain and the surrounding community.14 
Pamela Morris, an active Montanan, joined the Freedom from 
Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) in early 2012 because of her outrage at 
Big Mountain Jesus, which she encountered in 1957 and has actively 
avoided since.15 FFRF filed suit in the U.S. District Court of Montana 
against Chip Weber, Flathead National Forest Supervisor, and the USFS 
on February 8, 2012.16 FFRF requested a declaration that the USFS’s 
continued allowance of Big Mountain Jesus on public land violates the 
Establishment clause and an injunction ordering withdrawal of USFS 
authorization and removal of the statue.17 The District Court 
subsequently granted the Knights of Columbus’s unopposed motion to 
intervene.18  
The Knights of Columbus twice challenged the suit on the 
grounds that FFRF lacked standing to sue.19 The District Court twice 
denied motions on this issue, ultimately determining that FFRF had 
standing based on Ms. Morris’s membership at the time of filing.20 The 
                                           
8 Order 8. 
9 Id. at 8 
10 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 14. 
11 Order 9-10. 
12 Appellant’s Principal Br. 5-8. 
13 Order 10. 
14 Id. 
15 Order 16. 
16 Compl. Feb. 8, 2012, No. 9:12-cv-00019. 
17 Id. at 9-10. 
18 Order, May 9, 2012, No. 9:12-cv-00019. 
19 Order, Nov. 27, 2012, No. 9:12-cv-00019; Order, June 25, 2013, No. 9:12-cv-00019. 
20 Order 16, June 25, 2013. 
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District Court nonetheless granted summary judgment to the USFS and 
the Knights of Columbus on June 25, 2013, holding that the continued 
presence of Big Mountain Jesus on USFS land did not violate the 






The District Court analyzed FFRF’s standing to sue under 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, holding 
that FFRF had standing because “‘its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to 
the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.’“21 The holding was based in part on the individual standing of 
FFRF member Pamela Morris, with the court finding that she satisfied 
the test set forth in Summers v. Earth Island Institute: she could 
demonstrate the she was “under threat of suffering concrete and 
particularized ‘injury in fact; the threat must be actual and imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial 




Appellees Weber and the USFS did not win summary judgment 
on this issue but on the constitutional issue discussed below. On appeal, 
the Appellees argue that none of the three FFRF members upon whom 
the organization asserts its standing had individual standing to sue at the 
time the complaint was filed. Member William Cox may have had 
individual standing, but he was not a member when FFRF brought suit, 
and “[t]he existence of standing turns on the facts as they existed at the 
time the complaint was filed.”23 Member Doug Bonham was a member 
when FFRF sued, but his injury is neither ongoing nor concrete: he only 
saw the statue once and has not since been near it because “[his] aging 
knees limit [him].”24 Ms. Morris was also a member when the complaint 
was filed, but “her alleged injury is aesthetic or environmental, not 
religious”: she may suffer a direct and concrete injury, but her injury 
                                           
21 Id. at 14 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). 
22 Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). 
23 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 32 (citing Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 838 
(9th Cir. 2007)). 
24 Id. at 33. 
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stems from the artificiality of the statue in the mountains of Montana.25 
The appellees do not argue that FFRF would lack standing if Mr. Cox, 
Mr. Bonham, or Ms. Morris had individual standing to sue. 
In its reply brief, Appellant FFRF asserts that any of the three 
members mentioned had individual standing at the time the complaint 
was filed. Mr. Cox, a frequent Big Mountain skier, did not join FFRF 
until ten days after the complaint was filed, but he “seeks to vindicate . . . 
the very same cause of action that is at stake,” and allowing FFRF to 
bring suit on his behalf now promotes judicial economy.26 Mr. Bonham 
suffers injury even though he can no longer ski because the statue is a 
symbol of religious preference that marginalizes the non-believers such 
as himself throughout the Flathead Valley.27 Ms. Morris has 
affirmatively avoided “a significant and beautiful ski area in order to 





Appellees Weber and the USFS bring valid objections to the 
individual standing of Mr. Cox, Mr. Bonham, and Ms. Morris, but the 
Court may nonetheless determine that FFRF has standing based on that 
of Mr. Bonham or Ms. Morris. FFRF has been unable to present 
authority supporting consideration of Mr. Cox.29 Judicial economy may 
well be promoted by considering Mr. Cox’s standing, but a correct 
inquiry into the issue of standing likely supersedes consideration of 
judicial economy. The Court could find that Mr. Bonham’s concrete and 
actual injury is directly attributable to the statue because he has 
personally encountered it and was offended by it. It could also find that 
Mr. Bonham’s injury is not ongoing because his stated reason for 
avoiding the statue is his aging body rather than his outrage. 
Additionally, Mr. Bonham’s injury may be caused by the culture of his 
community rather than by the statue itself, in which case removal of Big 
Mountain Jesus would not redress his injury. Finally, Ms. Morris is 
clearly offended by Big Mountain Jesus, which she sees as a blatantly 
religious symbol, but her affidavit suggests that her injury may be caused 
by the artificiality rather than the religiosity of the statue. The Court 
could potentially dismiss for lack of standing, in which case Mr. Cox 
may immediately bring a new suit. 
 
B. The Establishment Clause 
                                           
25 Id. at 36. 
26 Appellant’s Reply Br. 10-11, May 14, 2014, No. 13-35770. 
27 Id. at 8-9. 
28 Id. at 9-10. 
29 Order 15-16, June 25, 2013, No. 9:12-cv-00019. 
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The District Court applied two analyses to determine the 
constitutionality of Big Mountain Jesus, ultimately determining that the 
USFS had not violated the Establishment Clause regardless of the 
analysis applied.30 The Lemon Test, established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
“requires that challenged government conduct must (1) have a secular 
purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; and (3) not foster excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”31 An exception was later developed in Van Orden v. Perry, 
where a plurality of the Court found the Lemon test unhelpful.32 In his 
concurrence, Justice Breyer noted that there is “no test-related substitute 
for the exercise of legal judgment[.]“33 Breyer considered the following 
factors in his analysis: the historical use of the monument, the 
surrounding context, the monument’s history, and the frequency of 
complaints.34 Following Trunk,35 the Ninth Circuit recognizes Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence as controlling.36 
 




Appellant FFRF argues that the district court erred in finding that 
Big Mountain Jesus passes the Lemon test.37 The government’s purpose 
was not “predominantly secular” when it authorized an obviously 
religious statue, and the USFS’s determination that the statue is 
historically important is unsupported by the record.38 The statue has the 
primary effect of advancing religion, as it is clearly a Christian shrine, 
and any ancillary patriotic or secular meaning is lost on its observers.39 
FFRF does not expressly address whether the statue fosters “excessive 
government entanglement with religion,” but it argues that “[t]he Jesus 
Shrine has the look and feel of being located on Forest Service land, and 
the Government’s authorizations have been characterized by secret and 
preferential consideration.”40  
 
Appellees Weber and the USFS assert that continued authorization of 
Big Mountain Jesus is permissible under the Lemon test. The government 
                                           
30 Id. at 28-29. 
31 Id. at 21 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). 
32 Id. at 21-22 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005)). 
33 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700, Breyer, J., concurring. 
34 Order at 22, June 25, 2013 (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700, Breyer, J., concurring). 
35 Trunk v. City of San Diego 629 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011). 
36 Order at 22, June 25, 2013. 
37 Appellant’s Principal Br. 35. 
38 Id. at 35-37. 
39 Id. at 41-44. 
40 Id. at 39. 
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must only show that it is motivated “at least in part by [a] secular 
purpose,”41 and the USFS was motivated by the historical and cultural 
importance of the statue, not the religious sentiment that motivated the 
Knights of Columbus.42 Big Mountain Jesus does not have a primary 
effect of advancing religion because a reasonable observer would not see 
the statue as endorsement of religion: it is on a privately operated ski hill 
with a plaque informing viewers of its history and private ownership.43 
Like FFRF, the USFS does not explicitly address the issue of 
entanglement, but it does argue that the USFS did not show preferential 




The Ninth Circuit could potentially go either way on the 
constitutionality of the USFS reissuance of permits under the Lemon test. 
The first element, secular purpose, will likely be satisfied if it accepts the 
standard advanced by the USFS and adopted by the District Court, in 
which a secular purpose need only be a partial motivation for the 
government action. The record supports a finding that Big Mountain 
Jesus serves a partially secular purpose. If, however, the Court requires 
the secular purpose to be primary, as FFRF argues it should, it will likely 
find that the USFS did not have a secular purpose, failing the Lemon test. 
The second element, the advancement of religion, also may or may not 
be satisfied. The Court will likely find that Big Mountain Jesus advances 
religion, but it may find that a reasonable observer would not impute its 
religious message to the government. The third element of entanglement 
will likely be satisfied if the second element is. The Court could also 
choose to avoid in-depth analysis, holding that a factual issue remains 
and remanding. 
 




Appellant FFRF asserts that the Van Orden Exception does not 
apply to the facts at hand because the Ninth Circuit applies the Lemon 
test unless the objection is to a “long-standing religious display[] that 
convey[s] a historical or secular message in a non-religious context,” and 
Big Mountain Jesus conveys a religious message.45 Unlike Van Orden, 
                                           
41 Cholla Ready Mix v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004). 
42 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 41-42. 
43 Id. at 45-46. 
44 Id. at 45, 57-64. 
45 Appellant’s Principal Br. at 35 (citing Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d at 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2008)). 
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where a Ten Commandments monolith was in a museum-like setting, 
surrounded by other secular objects that together brought a deeper 
understanding of Texas culture.46 Big Mountain Jesus has no “secular 
moral message.”47 Thus, the context does not secularize Big Mountain 
Jesus.48 Additionally, use of the statue is historically religious: “locals 
testify that the serenity of the site presents a meditative opportunity.”49 
Even the irreverent use points to the religiosity of the statue, as it “results 
from the very incongruity of a religious shrine in a national forest.”50  
Appellees Weber and the USFS argue that even If continued 
allowance of Big Mountain Jesus fails under Lemon, it falls within the 
exception outlined in Van Orden, and consideration of the statue’s use, 
context, and history warrants continued authorization.51 The statue’s 
secular uses far outweigh religious uses: “[t]he statue has seen only light 
and sporadic use as a site for religious services, but it has consistently 
been used as a meeting place, a site for photo-taking, and as an object of 
irreverent fun.”52 The context surrounding Big Mountain Jesus is largely 
secular, as the statue is within the borders of a ski resort, with no area 
dedicated to meditation or prayer.53 Finally, the history supports the 
USFS’s renewal of the Special Use Permit because Big Mountain Jesus 
went unchallenged for fifty-seven years, ten years longer than the Ten 




The Ninth Circuit will likely determine that Van Orden does not 
apply because the facts here are immediately distinguishable. The 
museum-like setting of Van Orden suggests that the Ten Commandments 
imparted a weighty historical message, not unlike teaching students of 
American History about the religious beliefs of early European settlers. 
Big Mountain Jesus is thoroughly enjoyed by locals, but the Court 
probably will not find irreverence and playfulness compelling enough to 
apply the Van Orden exception. If, however, the exception applies, its 
requirements will likely be satisfied: the use, context, and history of Big 
Mountain Jesus all serve to secularize the statue. 
 
3. Free Speech in a Public Forum 
 
                                           
46 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681, Breyer, J., concurring. 
47 Appellant’s Principal Br. at 45 (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681, Breyer, J., concurring). 
48 Id. at 47. 
49 Id. at 46. 
50 Id. at 47. 
51 Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 47. 
52 Id. at 48. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 48-49. 
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In granting summary judgment for Appellees Weber and the 
USFS, the District Court had no need to reach the Appellees’ argument 
that the First Amendment authorizes renewing the Knights of 




Appellees Weber and the USFS argue that the National Forest 
System lands were a limited public forum prior to 1998, when the 
regulations governing issuance of permits were overhauled.55 Big 
Mountain Jesus is “at most, private religious speech in a public forum,” 
and it is therefore authorized by the Free Speech clause and does not 
violate the Establishment clause.56 Because the USFS was a public forum 
when the permit was first issued, the USFS would have violated the 
Establishment Clause by denying the permit, suggesting prejudice 
against religion.57 Similarly, the USFS followed all applicable 
regulations in reauthorizing the permit, and those regulations are neutral 
as to religion, so denying reauthorization would have compromised the 
government’s neutrality toward religion.58 Further, because the USFS 
lands covers 193 acres, a monument such as Big Mountain Jesus does 
not represent government speech despite its permanence.59  
Appellant FFRF argues that a private party may not place a 
permanent religious monument on government land under the 
Establishment Clause.60 Even if the USFS lands are properly classified as 
a public forum, the “Free Speech Clause’s forum analysis ‘simply does 
not apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public 
property.’”61 The plaque’s attribution of the statue to the Knights of 
Columbus does nothing to further the USFS’s argument because the 
USFS’s allowance of the statue is at issue, not the statue itself.62 Thus, 




If the Ninth Circuit reaches this issue, it will probably find that 
the First Amendment does not allow the Knights of Columbus’s 
placement of Big Mountain Jesus on federal land. The USFS’s argument 
is flawed in that the USFS lands are no longer a public forum and they 
were not when the alleged injury—reissuance of the permit—took place. 
                                           
55 Id. at 49. 
56 Id. at 52. 
57 Id. at 54-55. 
58 Id. at 55. 
59 Id. at 56-57. 
60 Appellant’s Reply Br. 13. 
61 Id. at 15 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009)). 
62 Id. at 17-18. 
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Although FFRF is wrong to assert that there are no exceptions to the rule 
that permanent monuments may not be installed on public lands under 
the Free Speech clause’s forum analysis,63 the forum analysis probably 
does not apply. Even if it did, Big Mountain Jesus is unlikely to be an 
exception to the rule. 
 
                                           
63 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 56 (citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 480)(“Although [FFRF’s] 
quotation is accurate, it omits . . . ‘To be sure, there are limited circumstances in which the forum 
doctrine might properly be applied to a permanent monument . . . “). 
